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APPELLATE JURISDICTION FOR CIVIL FORFEITURE: THE
CASE FOR THE CONTINUATION OF JURISDICTION
BEYOND THE RELEASE OF THE RES
INTRODUCTION
For those unfamiliar with it, forfeiture1 can be among the most confus-
ing areas of the law.2 Part of this confusion results from the govern-
ment's use of two types of forfeiture. In one type, the criminal forfeiture
action, the forfeiture is a sanction imposed after a felony conviction,' and
therefore the action is in personam. The second type of forfeiture ac-
tion, civil forfeiture, is in rem-property, rather than a person, is consid-
ered to be the offending thing.' This Note will focus only on civil
forfeiture actions.6
1. Forfeiture is defined as "the divestiture without compensation of property used in
a manner contrary to the law of the sovereign." Asset Forfeiture Office, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Vol. 1, Asset Forfeiture: Law, Practice and Policy 1 (1988) [hereinafter Asset
Forfeiture].
2. See Valukas & Walsh, Forfeitures: When Uncle Sam Says You Can't Take It With
You, 14 Litigation 31, 31 (1988).
3. See Asset Forfeiture, supra note 1, at 2-3; 37 C.J.S. Forfeitures § 1 (1943). Crimi-
nal forfeiture empowers the judge to locate and confiscate the profits and instruments of
the crime when sentencing the defendant. See Asset Forfeiture, supra note 1, at Preface.
Criminal forfeiture has not become widespread in this country. See Cloud, Forfeiting
Defense Attorneys' Fees: Applying an Institutional Role Theory to Define Individual Con-
stitutional Rights, 1987 Wis. L. Rev. 1, 17-18 (1987). In response to the increasing prob-
lem of organized crime, however, in 1984 Congress established criminal forfeiture as a
penalty for RICO violations. See Cloud, supra, at 15-16.
4. See United States v. Kramer, 912 F.2d 1257, 1260 (11th Cir. 1990); United States
v. Certain Real Property Located at 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 1990);
see also Goldsmith & Linderman, Asset Forfeiture and Third Party Right: The Need for
Further Law Reform, 1989 Duke L.J 1254, 1254 (discussing criminal statutes authoriz-
ing forfeiture as a criminal sanction); Asset Forfeiture, supra note 1, at Preface ("criminal
forfeiture... focuses on the individual committing the crime"); 37 CJ.S. Forfeitures § 2
(1943) (at common law, criminal forfeiture did not attach in rem but was a consequence
of conviction).
5. See, eg., Day v. Micou, 85 U.S. 156, 162 (1873) ("Tlhe thing condemned is
considered as the offender .... "); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827) ("The
thing is here primarily considered as the offender ...."); United States v. Articles of
Drug Consisting of 203 Paper Bags, 818 F.2d 569, 571 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[A]n in rem case
... is ... a case nominally against a thing... ."); United States v. 3 Unlabeled 25-Pound
Bags Dried Mushrooms, 157 F.2d 722, 723 (7th Cir. 1946) ("The goods stand to an-
swer."); Asset Forfeiture, supra note 1, at Preface (civil forfeiture "focuses on... the
'guilty' property ... "); Note, Constitutional Rights and Civil Forfeiture Actions, 88
Colum. L. Rev. 390, 391 (1988) (in rem forfeiture is aimed at the property) [hereinafter
Note, Constitutional Rights].
6. The issue involved in this Note, the continuation of jurisdiction after the disposi-
tion of the forfeited property, involves only civil forfeiture actions because criminal forfei-
ture actions are in personam and the location of the property is thus irrelevant.
Civil forfeiture proceedings are separate and independent from any criminal trial. See
The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14-15 (1827); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leas-
ing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683-84 (1974); Asset Forfeiture, supra note 1, at 3; Comment, Civil
Forfeiture and Innocent Third Parties, 3 N. Ill. L. Rev. 323, 325 (1983) [hereinafter Com-
ment, Innocent Third Parties]. In general, civil forfeiture proceedings are treated as civil
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After a civil forfeiture hearing, as in every in rem proceeding, the
property is not immediately transferred to the prevailing party. Rather,
after the district court issues a judgment, there is an automatic stay for
ten days.7 During this period, the loser in the district court may move to
stay the judgment or file a supersedeas bond' with the appellate court.
Either of these actions will prevent the court from transferring the prop-
erty to the government until an appeal can be heard.9 If the losing party
has not taken either of these actions and the ten-day stay has expired, the
court may transfer the property to the government.' ° The court is not
required to notify the losing party before the property is actually
transferred. "
When the government prevails in the district court, the claimant fails
actions, and the burden is upon the government to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the property has been used for illegal purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 2461(a)
(1988); Asset Forfeiture, supra note 1, at 3. The placement of the burden of proof in civil
forfeiture actions is considered more fully infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
A court may carry out a civil forfeiture only when the court is authorized to do so by
statute. See Asset Forfeiture, supra note 1, at 1. Currently, there are over 100 federal
statutes that provide for civil forfeiture. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 11 (1988) (property subject
to antitrust laws in interstate commerce); 15 U.S.C. § 1177 (1988) (property used in con-
nection with illegal gambling); 16 U.S.C. §§ 65, 128, 171, 256(c) (1988) (guns and other
equipment used unlawfully in national parks); 19 U.S.C. § 1594 (1988) (property used in
violation of the customs laws); 21 U.S.C. § 334(a)(1) (1988) ("adulterated or mis-
branded" food, drugs or cosmetics); 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988) (property used for transpor-
tation and sale of illegal substances). For a complete list of the current statutes that
provide for civil forfeiture, see Asset Forfeiture Office, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Asset Forfei-
ture: Compilation of Civil Statutes.
The three essential elements of an in rem proceeding are the presence of the res in the
jurisdiction, seizure of the res and an opportunity for the owner or claimant to be heard.
See Pennington v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 272 (1917); see also United States v.
66 Pieces of Jade and Gold Jewelry, 760 F.2d 970, 972-73 (9th Cir. 1985) (jurisdiction is
defeated when res is removed from control of court); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Vessel
Bay Ridge, 703 F.2d 381, 384 (9th Cir. 1983) (without seizure of the property, there can
be no in rem jurisdiction), cert. dismissed, 467 U.S. 1247 (1984); Bank of New Orleans &
Trust Co. v. Marine Credit Corp., 583 F.2d 1063, 1067-68 (8th Cir. 1978) (jurisdiction is
defeated when res is removed from control of court).
7. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(a). Federal rule 62(a), in relevant part, reads: "no execu-
tion shall issue upon a judgment nor shall proceedings be taken for its enforcement until
the expiration of 10 days after its entry."
8. A supersedeas bond is a "bond required of one who petitions to set aside a judg-
ment or execution and from which the other party may be made whole if the action is
unsuccessful." Black's Law Dictionary 1438 (6th Ed. 1990). Application for a superse-
deas bond is made to the district court. See Fed. R. App. P. 8(a). The stay is not effective
until approved by the court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d). If, however, the district court
fails to approve the supersedeas bond, or application to the district court was "not practi-
cable," application may be made to the circuit court. See Fed. R. App. P. 8(a).
9. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d). Federal Rule 62(d), in pertinent part, reads: "When an
appeal is taken the appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may obtain a stay .... The
bond may be given at or after the time of filing the notice of appeal or of procuring the
order allowing the appeal, as the case may be."
10. See United States v. One Lear Jet Aircraft, 836 F.2d 1571, 1574 (11th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1204 (1988).
11. See United States v. $79,000 in United States Currency, 801 F.2d 738, 740 (5th
Cir. 1986).
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to post a supersedeas bond or file a motion to stay the judgment within
the ten-day period, the district court releases the property and the claim-
ant still wishes to appeal, a controversy ensues. A number of courts have
refused to hear a forfeiture appeal after the property has been transferred
to the government because the release of the res terminates in rem juris-
diction. 2 Recently, however, two courts have decided to hear the ap-
peal. 3 While these courts continued the tradition of treating forfeiture
as actions in rem, 4 they have held that they have personal jurisdiction
for the purposes of the appeal.1 5 This Note discusses the policy argu-
ments that support both positions in the controversy.
Part I of this Note traces the history of civil forfeiture actions, explain-
ing the origins of the rule that forfeitures are in rem. This background is
necessary to determine whether this rule should be continued. Part II
discusses the policies that support the continued use of in rem jurisdic-
tion for civil forfeiture. Part III examines the controversy surrounding
the "no res, no case" rule.16 Part IV suggests the possibility of creating
an exception to the "no res, no case" rule to cover forfeiture actions.
Part V analyzes the position of the courts that have asserted in personam
jurisdiction over the government in order to hear the appeal. This Note
concludes that an additional exception to the "no res, no case" rule
should be created to grant courts jurisdiction after the res has been re-
moved from the court's control. Alternatively, this Note argues that
courts should exercise in personam jurisdiction over the government.
Either of these actions would ensure that forfeiture disputes are decided
correctly and justly.
I. THE HISTORY OF IN REM FORFEITURE
A. Deodands and Forfeiture in England
In rem forfeiture is descended from the English concept of deodands.'7
12. See One Lear Jet Aircraft, 836 F.2d at 1574; $79,000 in United States Currency,
801 F.2d at 739; United States v. $57,480.05 United States Currency, 722 F.2d 1457,
1458-59 (9th Cir. 1984).
13. See United States v. $95,945.18, United States Currency, 913 F.2d 1106, 1109
(4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Aiello, 912 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 757 (1991).
14. The concept that the action is against the property, not the owner of the property,
is referred to in this Note as the "in rem rule," not to be confused with the "no res, no
case" rule. See infra note 16.
15. See Aiello, 912 F.2d at 6-7; S95,945.18, United States Currency, 913 F.2d at 1109.
16. The rule that the release of the res destroys in rem jurisdiction is referred to in
this Note as the "no res, no case" rule. This term is from United States v. Articles of
Drug Consisting of 203 Paper Bags, 818 F.2d 569, 571 (7th Cir. 1987).
17. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-81 (1974); 0.
Holmes, The Common Law 23 (M. Howe ed. 1963); Comment, Innocent Third Parties,
supra note 6, at 326-27. Deodands, in turn, have their origin in "the confluence and
merger of two traditions, the biblical and pre-Christian ones." Finkelstein, The Goring
Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures Wrongful Death and the
Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 Temp. L.Q. 169, 181 (1973). According to Justice
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Under this concept, the value of an object that caused the death of a
person was forfeited to the King."i This procedure differs from forfeiture
because forfeiture requires the relinquishment of the offending 19 object
itself.2° Like forfeiture, however, the proceeding was brought in rem and
the object was considered to be the guilty party.2 The English Parlia-
ment abolished the institution of deodands in 1846,22 largely because the
system was thought to be irrational.23 After the abolition of deodands,
the concept of civil forfeiture developed from a confluence of the deo-
dand tradition and the belief that a wrongdoer could be denied its
property.24
In addition to deodands, early English common law provided for the
forfeiture of property upon conviction of a felony or of treason.25 These
actions were in personam, and as such, were dependent upon and inci-
dent to a criminal conviction.26 Courts justified these forfeitures on the
theory that a breach of the King's peace was cause to deny the defendant
the right to own property.27
B. Forfeiture in the United States
The institution of deodands was never established in the United
Brennan, the biblical origins are found in Exodus 21:28, which reads: "If an ox gore a
man or a woman, and they die, he shall be stoned: and his flesh shall not be eaten." See
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. at 681 n.17. The pre-Christian origins are found in
Anglo-Saxon, Roman and African tribal law. See Finkelstein, supra, at 181-82.
18. See 0. Holmes, supra note 17, at 23; Comment, Innocent Third Parties, supra note
6, at 327. The justification for forfeiting the value of the property to the King was the
belief that the King would use the money to provide for masses to be said for the dead
person's soul. See Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. at 681; Comment, Innocent
Third Parties, supra note 6, at 327. When the King ceased using the money for religious
purposes, the justification for payment to the King was that deodands were a penalty for
carelessness. See Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. at 681; 0. Holmes, supra note 17,
at 24.
19. For the purposes of deodand, the object is "offending" only in the sense that it
caused, or was part of the cause, of the death of a person. For example, if a man or
woman suffered a fatal fall from a tree, the value of the tree was paid to the King as a
deodand. See 0. Holmes, supra note 17, at 23.
20. See supra note 1.
21. See Comment, Innocent Third Parties, supra note 6, at 327.
22. See id. at 328; Finkelstein, supra note 17, at 170.
23. See Finkelstein, supra note 17, at 171. Lord Campbell, the individual who first
proposed the abolition of deodands remarked, "the wonder was that a law so extremely
absurd and inconvenient should have remained in force down to the middle of the nine-
teenth century .... I Id. (quoting 77 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 1031 (1845)).
Professor Finkelstein theorizes that Parliament abolished deodands in 1846 due to the
effects of modem transportation. When motorized traffic increased, accidental death be-
came a frequent occurrence. See id. at 171-73. Consequently, about the same time as
Parliament abolished deodands, Parliament passed a bill that would more adequately
compensate the families of accident victims. See id.
24. See Comment, Innocent Third Parties, supra note 6, at 329 n.37.
25. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974); Com-
ment, Innocent Third Parties, supra note 6, at 328; 37 C.J.S. Forfeitures § 3 (1943).
26. See Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. at 682.
27. See id.
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States.2" The concept of forfeiture, however, has been accepted in this
country for a considerable time.2 9 Among the first civil forfeiture laws
were ones that required the forfeiture of those ships that delivered slaves
from foreign countries.30
The Supreme Court has, from time to time, considered issues involving
civil forfeiture.3" In The Palmyra,32 the Supreme Court concluded that a
pirate ship could be forfeited even though the ship's owners were neither
charged with nor convicted of piracy. 3 The Supreme Court has also
held that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth 34 and fifth3 amend-
ments may not be used in forfeiture proceedings. In perhaps the most
important modem forfeiture case, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leas-
ing Co.,36 the Supreme Court held that due process does not require the
government to hold a hearing, nor to give notice, before seizing property
pursuant to forfeiture statutes.3a
II. THE POLICIES SUPPORTING IN REM CIVIL FORFEITURE
The concept of government-initiated action against specific property,
rather than against an individual, still exists. There are at least two pos-
sible justifications for continuing the practice of civil forfeiture directly
against property: the admiralty justification and the crime-control
justification.
A. The Admiralty Justification
The in rem rule originated in admiralty law.38 The rule allowed those
injured by a ship to seek redress against the ship, rather than against the
ship's owner, because the ship's owner often was in a foreign land and
thus not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.3 9
28. See id.
29. During the American Revolution, the colonies passed laws that required forfei-
ture of the estate of any individual convicted of loyalty to the King of England. See 37
C.J.S. Forfeitures § 3. Because these forfeitures were the result of a conviction for loyalty
to the King, they were criminal forfeitures that attached in personam.
30. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974).
31. See, eg., id at 679 (no requirement for pre-seizure notice or hearing); One 1958
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 698-99 (1965) (application of fourth
amendment to civil forfeiture); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-34 (1886) (appli-
cation of fourth and fifth amendments to civil forfeiture); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 1, 14-15 (1827) (forfeiture of party's property without conviction of party).
32. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827). The Palmyra was the first Supreme Court case to
consider in rem forfeiture. See Comment, Innocent Third Parties, supra note 6, at 329-30.
33. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 15 (1827).
34. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 698.
35. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-34 (1886).
36. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
37. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679-80 (1974).
38. See Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 21-23 (1960); Treasure
Salvors v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330, 333-34
(5th Cir. 1978); Asset Forfeiture, supra note 1, at Preface.
39. See Continental Grain Co., 364 U.S. at 23; Treasure Salhors, 569 F.2d at 334; 0.
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This justification continues to have some force today. Arguably, in
rem forfeiture allows the United States government to punish foreign
criminals much the same way that in rem admiralty actions allowed
courts to compensate Americans injured by foreigners. For example,
civil forfeiture is a particularly effective weapon against today's interna-
tional drug trade.' The United States government could seize property
used in the drug trade that belonged to Colombian drug traffickers, even
though it might lack jurisdiction actually to arrest the drug traffickers.41
B. The Crime-Control Justification
Another argument for the continuation of in rem jurisdiction in forfei-
ture proceedings is that the threat of imprisonment is not enough to pre-
vent crime. Forfeiture directed against the property efficiently removes
the profit from crime.42 Civil forfeiture aids in the battle against crime
through two of its most important characteristics: its lower burden of
proof and its in rem nature.4 3
Civil forfeiture proceedings are separate from criminal trials.44 They
generally are treated as civil actions requiring the government to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the property has been used for
some illegal purpose.45 Some statutes specifically authorize the use of the
Holmes, supra note 17, at 26. Oliver Wendell Holmes asserted that this justification sim-
ply masked the real reason that courts allowed actions against a ship, which is the person-
ification of ships in every day thought. Id. at 24-29.
40. For a discussion of the advantages the government gains in civil forfeiture pro-
ceedings by the lesser burden of proof, see infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
41. In this hypothetical scenario, the government would proceed under 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(6) (1988). See supra note 6. The customs law, 19 U.S.C. § 1594 (1988), pro-
vides another instance where the admiralty justification would support the continued use
of in rem forfeiture. It is quite probable that a large number of items shipped in violation
of customs laws are sent by foreign corporations or foreign individuals who are not sub-
ject to the personal jurisdiction of United States Courts.
42. See Asset Forfeiture, supra note 1, at Preface.
43. The lower burden of proof and the in rem nature of civil forfeiture are not the
only advantages the government gains through the use of civil forfeiture. Civil forfeiture
also gives the government access to civil discovery devices, requires the claimant to estab-
lish standing to contest the forfeiture and denies the claimant eighth amendment protec-
tion from excessively high penalties. See Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 4, at 1263
n.36 & n.37. Moreover, the government may proceed administratively in civil forfeiture
actions for under $100,000, and an innocent verdict in a prior criminal proceeding con-
cerning the same events is not binding on the civil court. See id. at 1263 n.37.
44. In fact, the government need not even pursue a criminal conviction. See Note,
The Innocent Owner Defense to Real Property Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive Crime
ControlAct of 1984, 58 Fordham L. Rev. 471,473 (1989) [hereinafter Note, The Innocent
Owner Defense]; supra note 4 and authorities cited therein; see also United States v.
$95,945.18, United States Currency, 913 F.2d 1106, 1107 (4th Cir. 1990) (neither state
nor federal government prosecuted the claimant for participating in drug transaction).
45. See 28 U.S.C. § 2461(a) (1988). 28 U.S.C. § 2461(a) reads, in relevant part:
"Whenever a civil fine, penalty or pecuniary forfeiture is prescribed for the violation of an
Act of Congress without specifying the mode of recovery or enforcement thereof, it may
be recovered in a civil action." In addition, the statute provides that forfeiture proceed-
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customs law procedure,' requiring the government to show even less
than in a civil trial-the government need only establish probable cause
that the property was used in violation of the law. This showing then
shifts the burden of proof to the party claiming the property. 7 In either
case, the burden of proof is significantly less than in a criminal trial."
Because cases often "turn on the burden of proof," this lesser burden
gives the government a large advantage.' 9
In rem forfeiture is more efficient in the battle against crime than in
personam forfeiture because in rem forfeiture is not dependent upon a
conviction of the individual.5" If the government can prove that the
property has been used for the advancement of crime, it need not show
who used this property. Also, the government will succeed if it "can
establish probable cause by showing a nexus between the property in
question and the [criminal] activity, [even if] the government [cannot]
connect the property to a specific [criminal] transaction."'" Thus, law
enforcement authorities are presented with a useful, efficient tool against
crime.
Because civil forfeiture is such an effective weapon against crime, some
courts and commentators have urged that criminal procedural safe-
guards be applied in civil forfeiture actions.52 Other courts, however,
continue to view the actions as primarily against property and refuse to
treat civil forfeiture differently than private-party in rem proceedings.5 3
ings "shall conform as near as may be to proceedings in admiralty." 28 U.S.C. § 2461(b)
(1988).
46. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 3374(a)(2) (1988) (forfeiture of instruments used to illegally
transport fish and wildlife); 17 U.S.C. § 509(b) (1988) (forfeiture of records produced in
violation of copyright laws); 18 U.S.C. § 512(b)(1) (1988) (forfeiture of motor vehicles
that have had their identification numbers altered); 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1988) (forfeiture
of controlled substances).
47. See 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1988). This section reads: "[Iln all suits or actions brought
for the recovery of the value of any vessel, vehicle, aircraft, merchandise, or baggage,...
the burden of proof shall be upon the defendant: Provided, That probable cause shall be
first shown for the institution of such suit or action, to be judged of by the court ......
(emphasis in original).
48. See Note, The Innocent Owner Defense, supra note 44, at 474.
49. Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 4, at 1261 n.31.
50. See supra notes 4 & 44 and authorities cited therein.
51. Note, Shouldn't the Punishment Fit the Crime?, 55 Brooklyn L. Rev. 417, 419
(1989) [hereinafter Note, Shouldn't the Punishment Fit the Crime].
52. See, e.g., United States v. $95,945.18, United States Currency, 913 F.2d 1106,
1109-10 (4th Cir. 1990) (refusing to end jurisdiction by applying "no res, no case" rule
because civil forfeiture gives government a large advantage); United States v. One Lear
Jet Aircraft, 836 F.2d 1571, 1578 (1 1th Cir.) (en banc) (Vance, J., dissenting) (same), cert.
denied, 487 U.S. 1204 (1988); Note, Shouldn't the Punishment Fit the Crime, supra note
51, at 437-38 (arguing that eighth amendment should be applied to civil forfeiture).
53. Cf. One Lear Jet Aircraft, 836 F.2d at 1573-74 (deciding forfeiture jurisdiction
question on basis of previous decisions in private-party in rem proceedings); United States
v. $79,000 in United States Currency, 801 F.2d 738, 739-40 (5th Cir. 1986) (same).
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III. THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION CONTROVERSY
A. "No Res, No Case"
Conceptually, civil forfeiture is an action against the property of an
individual instead of directly against the individual. Accordingly, the
rule in a forfeiture proceeding that removal of the seized property from
the court's control results in a loss of jurisdiction by the appellate court
has wide acceptance.5"
Among the courts that have refused to hear an appeal on this ground,
the leading case is United States v. One Lear Jet Aircraft." One Lear Jet
Aircraft involved a civil forfeiture proceeding against an airplane used by
persons who had made material misrepresentations on their visas.
56
Leybda Corporation intervened as a claimant, and after a trial, the dis-
trict court concluded that the plane should be forfeited." During the
automatic ten-day stay, Leybda took no action.5" Once the automatic
stay expired, the government moved the plane to a warehouse outside the
appellate court's jurisdiction.59 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, sitting en banc, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear
Leybda's appeal.6'
The court reasoned that "[tihe general rule of in rem jurisdiction is
that the court's power derives entirely from its control over the defend-
ant res.' '61 Because the plane was properly removed from the jurisdic-
tion,62 the court no longer had control of the plane, destroying in rem
jurisdiction.63 The court reasoned that because in rem jurisdiction was
54. See United States v. One Lear Jet Aircraft, 836 F.2d 1571, 1574-75 (11th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1204 (1988); United States v. $79,000 in United States Cur-
rency, 801 F.2d 738, 739 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. One 1979 Rolls-Royce Cor-
niche Convertible, 770 F.2d 713, 717 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. 66 Pieces of Jade
and Gold Jewelry, 760 F.2d 970, 972-73 (9th Cir. 1985); Bank of New Orleans & Trust
Co. v. Marine Credit Corp., 583 F.2d 1063, 1067-68 (8th Cir. 1978).
55. 836 F.2d 1571 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1204 (1988).
56. See One Lear Jet Aircraft, 836 F.2d at 1573.
57. See id.
58. See id. During the automatic stay period, Leybda could have filed a motion to
stay the judgment or filed a supersedeas bond with the appellate court. See supra notes 7-
9 and accompanying text. Leybda, however, may not have had sufficient funds for a
bond. See One Lear Jet Aircraft, 836 F.2d at 1574 n.1.
59. See id. at 1574. The government took the plane from the control of the district
court in the Southern District of Florida, which is in the Eleventh Circuit, and moved it
to a warehouse in Missouri, which is in the Fifth Circuit. See id at 1573.
60. See id. at 1573. The case actually has a more complicated procedural history.
Originally, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that it had juris-
diction and heard the appeal. The panel affirmed the judgment of forfeiture. See United
States v. One Lear Jet Aircraft, 808 F.2d 765, 767 (11th Cir. 1987). The full court then
vacated this opinion and ordered en banc consideration of the jurisdictional issue. See
United States v. One Lear Jet Aircraft, 831 F.2d 221, 221 (11th Cir. 1987).
61. One Lear Jet Aircraft, 836 F.2d at 1573.
62. The Supreme Court has created an exception to the "no res, no case" rule that
allows for the continuation of jurisdiction when the res is improperly removed. See infra
notes 102-105 and accompanying text.
63. See One Lear Jet Aircraft, 836 F.2d at 1574.
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no longer available, it could hear the appeal only if it had in personam
jurisdiction over the claimant.64
The court examined 28 U.S.C. sections 134565 and 1355,6 which grant
original jurisdiction for forfeiture cases to the district court. The court
concluded that these statutes conferred upon the district court only sub-
ject matter jurisdiction and were not meant to change the traditional "no
res, no case" rule.67 The court rejected the claim that the government,
simply by bringing the action, consented to in personam jurisdiction.68
The court reasoned that "[tlo hold that the government 'consented' to in
personam jurisdiction would be tantamount to deciding that a court has
in personam jurisdiction over any participant in an in rem proceeding.
This does not comport with the traditional analysis of in rem jurisdic-
tion."69 Finally, the court distinguished this case from a binding Fifth
Circuit case, Inland Credit Corp. v. MIT Bow Egret,70 that had held a
claimant consented to in personam jurisdiction when he appealed a lower
court decision that was brought both in personam and in rem.7"
The court in One Lear Jet Aircraft reasoned that denying jurisdiction
64. See id. at 1574-75.
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1988) reads: "Except as otherwise provided by Act of Con-
gress, the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or pro-
ceedings commenced by the United States, or by any agency or officer thereof expressly
authorized to sue by Act of Congress."
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1355 (1988) reads: "The district court shall have original jurisdic-
tion, exclusive of the courts of the States, of any action or proceeding for the recovery or
enforcement of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, incurred under
any Act of Congress, except matters within the jurisdiction of the Court of International
Trade under section 1582 of this title."
67. See, United States v. One Lear Jet Aircraft, 836 F.2d 1571, 1575 (11th Cir.) (en
banc), cert denied, 487 U.S. 1204 (1988). The court reached this conclusion by examin-
ing the legislative history of 19 U.S.C. § 1605, a part of the customs law. The legislative
history of this section, which allows property, usually perishable goods, to be stored
outside the jurisdiction with no effect on jurisdiction, said the section was necessary to
change the in rem rule that requires the court to have control of the res. See id. Because
28 U.S.C. sections 1345 and 1355 existed when Congress passed 19 U.S.C. section 1605,
the court reasoned that this part of 19 U.S.C. section 1605 would have been unnecessary
had Congress intended to change the in rem rule by enacting sections 1345 and 1355. See
id,
68. See id. at 1576.
69. Id. at 1577.
70. 552 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1977). Because the Eleventh Circuit was created by di-
viding the Fifth Circuit, cases decided by the Fifth Circuit prior to 1981 are binding on
the Eleventh Circuit. See The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (1980).
71. See United States v. One Lear Jet Aircraft, 836 F.2d 1571, 1576 (1 1th Cir.) (en
banc), cerL denied, 487 U.S. 1204 (1988). The court distinguished this case by claiming
that Inland Credit held that a party to an in rem action consents to in personam jurisdic-
tion when he appeals a decision that is both in rem and in personam. Because this case
did not present "an interface of in rem and in personam jurisdiction," the action by the
government did not amount to consent to in personam jurisdiction. See One Lear Jet
Aircraft, 836 F.2d at 1576 (citing Inland Credit, 552 F.2d at 1152). For a discussion of




was fair because various procedural safeguards, such as a supersedeas
bond and a motion to stay the judgment, should prevent a claimant who
seeks an appeal from being denied that opportunity. 2 Moreover, the
court claimed, this holding is less strict and, therefore, more fair than
holdings of other courts that have placed an affirmative duty upon a
claimant to seek a bond or to move to stay when filing an appeal.73
Most courts that have supported this view do not examine the issue in
as much detail as the court in One Lear Jet Aircraft. Rather, the other
courts that have supported the traditional rule that the presence of the
res is required throughout the litigation have generally done so by merely
indicating the existence of the general rule with little or no discussion.74
72. See One Lear Jet Aircraft, 836 F.2d at 1573-74. The court disputed the dissent's
claim that Leybda could not afford the supersedeas bond. See id. at 1574 n. 1.
73. One Lear Jet Aircraft, 836 F.2d at 1574. The court listed Bank of New Orleans v.
Marine Credit Corp., 583 F.2d 1063, 1068 (8th Cir. 1978), and United States v.
$57,480.05 United States Currency, 722 F.2d 1457, 1458-59 (9th Cir. 1984), as cases that
have imposed such a duty upon losing claimants. See id.
74. See United States v. $79,000 in United States Currency, 801 F.2d 738, 739 (5th
Cir. 1986); United States v. One 1979 Rolls-Royce Corniche Convertible, 770 F.2d 713,
716-17 (7th Cir. 1985).
The Ninth Circuit adopted the "no res, no case" rule and then proceeded to find other
impediments to jurisdiction. In United States v. $57,480.05 United States Currency, 722
F.2d 1457, 1458-59 (9th Cir. 1984), for example, the forfeiture had been executed and the
funds had been paid to the United States Treasury. See id. at 1458. The court found that
under these circumstances, aside from the "no res, no case" rule, there were two addi-
tional impediments to jurisdiction. First, a judgment for the claimant would require "an
impermissible payment of public funds not appropriated by Congress." Id. at 1459.
These payments would not be allowable due to the Constitution's appropriations clause.
See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. Second, the court found that "[e]nforcing a constructive
trust on the Government would violate sovereign immunity in the absence of statutes or
regulations clearly establishing fiduciary obligations." $57,480.05 United States Cur-
rency, 722 F.2d at 1459.
In United States v. $10,000 in United States Currency, 860 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1988),
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals seemed to move away from the holding in $57,480.05
United States Currency. The court asserted that the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(a)(2) (1988), gives district courts the right to hear any case against the United
States for $10,000 or less when the claim is based upon an act of Congress. Further, the
court argued, any claim asserting a wrongful forfeiture is a claim under the Little Tucker
Act. See $10,000 in United States Currency, 860 F.2d at 1514. As for the constitutional
problem, the court stated that the appropriations clause is not applicable where the
money in question is under a constructive trust. See id. If, as the claimant had asserted,
the res was released improperly, a constructive trust would be possible. See id.
The court, however, did not overrule $57,480.05 United States Currency because in
that case the claim was for more than $10,000, thus the little Tucker Act did not apply.
In addition, the claimant in $57,480.05 United States Currency did not assert that the
court had released the res improperly, so a constructive trust was not possible. See
$10,000 in United States Currency, 860 F.2d at 1514.
Other courts have not followed the holding in $57,480.05 United States Currency.
Rather, they have characterized the situation as "analogous to a suit for the refund of
erroneously paid taxes or to recover for a wrongful levy," United States v. $95,945.18,
United States Currency, 913 F.2d 1106, 1110 n.4 (4th Cir. 1990), or have held that the
appropriations clause only involves funds that "'ariseU from taxes, customs, etc.'"
United States v. Aiello, 912 F.2d 4, 7 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Varney v. Warehime, 147
F.2d 238, 245 (6th Cir. 1945)), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 757 (1991).
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B. Breaking from the "No Res, No Case" Rule
The first case to break entirely from the "no res, no case" rule" was
United States v. Aiello.76 This case involved property that was allegedly
purchased with money gained from' and property used in" the sale of
narcotics.7 9
In Aiello, the court heavily criticized "the concepts of continuing terri-
torial presence and control in forfeiture actions."" ° The court noted that
these concepts are derived from "the admiralty fiction of a ship's person-
ality, a legal construct of dubious validity."'" Moreover, the court rea-
soned that because these concepts are "diminishing in admiralty," they
should not be "routinely invoked to deny citizens an opportunity for ap-
pellate review of judgments forfeiting their property to the
Government."82
The court, however, did not hold that in rem jurisdiction could con-
tinue beyond the release of the res.8 3 Instead, the court concluded that it
could exercise in personam jurisdiction over the government 4 on the
theory that the United States submitted itself to in personam jurisdiction
simply by bringing a suit against the property. 5
Similarly, in United States v. $95,945.18, United States Currency, 6 the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals also heard an appeal after the res had
been released from the court's control. The case involved cash that was
allegedly used to purchase narcotics.8 7 The claimant, Lee Baxter, lost in
the district court and failed to file a supersedeas bond or to move to stay
the judgment.88 After the expiration of the automatic ten-day stay, the
75. The rule has been limited for some time, however, by a few exceptions. See infra
notes 98-109 and accompanying text.
76. 912 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 757 (1991).
77. The government commenced these forfeiture proceedings against this property
under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988), which calls for the forfeiture of "[a]ll moneys, negoti-
able instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or intended to be furnished
by any person in exchange for a controlled substance" and "all moneys, negotiable instru-
ments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation" of the con-
trolled substance law. Id
78. The government commenced these forfeiture proceedings pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(7) (1988), which calls for the forfeiture of"[a]ll real property... which is used,
or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate" the use of
controlled substances.
79. See Aiello, 912 F.2d at 5.
80. Id. at 6.
81. Id.
82. Id at 6-7.
83. Cf id. at 6 ("At most, these propositions concern in rem jurisdiction and do not
necessarily determine whether an appellate court, asked to review a forfeiture judgment,
may do so in the exercise of in personam jurisdiction.").
84. See id. at 7.
85. See id
86. 913 F.2d 1106 (4th Cir. 1990).
87. See id. at 1107. The government pursued the forfeiture pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(6) (1988). See id. at 1110.
88. See id. at 1107.
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government transferred the money into the United States Marshal's Ser-
vice Asset Forfeiture Fund. 9
The opinion in $95,945.18, United States Currency began by pointing
out that courts, relying on Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585,90
have begun to depart from the rule requiring the res to be in the jurisdic-
tion.91 The court held that the "invocation of the in rem rule is particu-
larly inapposite to defeat jurisdiction in a government-initiated civil
forfeiture action."92  Thus, unlike the Aiello court, the court in
$95,945.18, United States Currency held that the "no res, no case" rule
did not apply to forfeiture actions, thereby creating a new exception to
the "no res, no case" rule.93 The court based its holding on two ratio-
nales. First, forfeiture provides a very harsh remedy while imposing a
comparatively low burden of proof on the government.94 Second, the in
rem rule was developed to provide a forum for litigants. 9" In this in-
stance, the government was attempting to use the rule to deny a forum
for disputes and thus for the opposite purpose for which the rule was
created.96
In addition to its in rem ruling, the court held that the government
had consented to in personam jurisdiction by bringing the action.97
Although both Aiello and $95,945.18, United States Currency held that
the government consents to in personam jurisdiction by bringing the ac-
89. See id. Congress created the Assets Forfeiture Fund through 28 U.S.C.
§ 524(c)(1) (1988), which states: "There is established in the United States Treasury a
special fund to be known as the Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund ... " The
fund's assets come from "all amounts from the forfeiture of property under any law en-
forced or administered by the Department of Justice.. . ." id. § 524(c)(4). The Justice
Department may then use the funds to finance expenses involved in prosecuting other
forfeiture actions. See id. § 524(c)(1)(A)-(H).
90. 364 U.S. 19 (1960). In Continental Grain, the Supreme Court was very critical of
in rem jurisdiction. See id. at 25-26; infra note 121 and accompanying text.
91. See United States v. $95,945.18, United States Currency, 913 F.2d 1106, 1109
(4th Cir. 1990). The court identified United States v. An Article of Drug Consisting of
4,680 Pails, 725 F.2d 976, 982 (5th Cir. 1984), Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified
Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330, 334 (5th Cir. 1978), and Inland
Credit Corp. v. M/T Bow Egret, 552 F.2d 1148, 1152 (5th Cir. 1977), as cases that began
the process of departing from the in rem rule. See $95,945.18, United States Currency,
913 F.2d at 1109.
92. $95,945.18, United States Currency, 913 F.2d at 1109.
93. Several exceptions to the rule already existed. See infra notes 98-109 and accom-
panying text.
94. See $95,945.18, United States Currency, 913 F.2d at 1109. For more about the
burden of proof, see supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
96. See $95,945.18, United States Currency, 913 F.2d at 1109. The court also con-
cluded that a stay of execution or the filing of a supersedeas bond were not necessary in
these cases. See id. Because a supersedeas bond is designed to protect the interests of the
party that prevailed in the district court, and because the assets, which were in the hands
of the United States government, were unlikely to disappear, obtaining a bond was unnec-
essary. See id.
97. See $95,945.18, United States Currency, 913 F.2d at 1109.
1991] CIVIL FORFEITURE
tion, neither case went so far as to hold that civil forfeiture actions could
only be pursued in personam.
IV. THE IN REM THEORY
A. The "No Res, No Case" Exceptions
By refusing to apply the "no res, no case" rule in civil forfeiture pro-
ceedings, the court in $95,945.18, United States Currency, effectively cre-
ated an exception to that rule. Before this case, courts allowed in rem9"
jurisdiction to continue despite the loss of the res in at least three other
instances: when the res is removed improperly from the jurisdiction,"
when there is an "interface" of in rem and in personam jurisdiction,co
and when convenience dictates that the res be stored outside the
jurisdiction. 101
The oldest exception to the "no res, no case" rule is the improper re-
moval exception."°2 Under this exception, an appellate court retains ju-
risdiction after the release of the res if the release occurred accidentally,
improperly or fraudulently.0 3 Although this exception is the oldest and
most frequently mentioned exception," 4 very few courts have actually
held that a res was removed accidentally, improperly or fraudulently.0 5
Another exception to the "no res, no case" rule is the "interface" ex-
98. In United States v. Aiello, 912 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 757
(1991), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit suggested that when a court exercises
jurisdiction in a forfeiture proceeding despite the absence of the res, the court actually
might be exercising in personam jurisdiction. See id. at 6 n.2. This idea, however, is
contrary to most cases, which discuss the continuation of jurisdiction as an exception to
the in rem rule. See, e-g., United States v. $10,000 in United States Currency, 860 F.2d
1511, 1513 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The general rule is that, in an in rem action, removal of the
res ends the jurisdiction of the court. But exceptions exist." (emphasis added)); United
States v. $79,000 in United States Currency, 801 F.2d 738, 739 (5th Cir. 1986) ("The
Supreme Court... created an exception ... that courts do not lose jurisdiction if the res
... is released.. . ." (emphasis added)); United States v. One 1979 Rolls-Royce Comiche
Convertible, 770 F.2d 713, 716 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The claimant has... point[ed] out...
the exception to this general rule ...." (emphasis added)).
99. See infra notes 102-105 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 106-108 and accompanying text.
101. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
102. See The Rio Grande, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 458, 465 (1874).
103. See id. The Supreme Court in The Rio Grande also held that giving the property
to the prevailing claimant in exchange for security does not result in a loss of in rem
jurisdiction. See id. This holding may appear at first to be another exception to the "no
res, no case" rule, but the court is actually acting on a substitute res and therefore is not
proceeding in rem without a res.
104. See, eg., United States v. $10,000 in United States Currency, 860 F.2d 1511, 1513
(9th Cir. 1988) (mentioning exception); United States v. $79,000 in United States Cur-
rency, 801 F.2d 738, 739 (5th Cir. 1986) (same); United States v. One 1979 Rolls-Royce
Corniche Convertible, 770 F.2d 713, 716 (7th Cir. 1985) (same).
105. See $10,000 in United States Currency, 860 F.2d at 1513. In fact, according to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, this exception had not actually been applied since The
Rio Grande. See id. In $10,000 in United States Currency, however, the court remanded
the case for a trial court determination of whether the res had been disposed of properly.
Id. at 1514. Since $10,000 in United States Currency, the same court has had the oppor-
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ception. 10 6 This exception provides that when in rem and in personam
proceedings are brought in the same overall action, the in rem proceed-
ing may be transferred with the in personam action, via the forum non
conveniens statute.107 The in rem proceeding is thus held in a district
court that does not have physical control of the res. The exception for an
"interface" of in personam and in rem jurisdiction has been extended
beyond forum non conveniens so that an appellate court can continue to
use its in personam jurisdiction to correct errors in a lower court's in rem
ruling.10 8
Congress created a final exception to the "no res, no case" rule by
statute. At least two statutes authorize the government to remove seized
property from the jurisdiction without affecting jurisdiction when it is
convenient for storage purposes.1°9
B. The Policies Behind the "No Res, No Case" Exceptions
Each of the exceptions to the "no res, no case" rule is supported by the
same general policy considerations. These considerations include the de-
sire to reach a fair and correct result, ° the desire to use a legal fiction
only for the purpose for which it was created, 1 and the desire to ensure
that the law produces a sensible result. 12
The in rem fiction originated as a remedy, when one might not other-
wise exist, for those injured by a ship.1 13 A few courts have stated that
this fiction should not be used to deny people their day in court because it
was developed to ensure the opposite purpose, to create a forum for liti-
gants.' 14 Therefore, one policy behind the exceptions is to prevent the in
rem legal fiction from being used for a purpose other than that for which
it was created.
The oldest exception, which allows for continuing jurisdiction despite
the accidental, improper or fraudulent release of the res, was established
to preserve the right of appeal. Had the Supreme Court refused to create
this exception in The Rio Grande,"' the court would have denied a
claimant the opportunity to appeal an adverse decision, and the Supreme
tunity to apply the exception. See United States v. $84,740.00 United States Currency,
900 F.2d 1402, 1406 (9th Cir. 1990).
106. See Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 23 (1960).
107. See id. at 23. The Continental Grain court conducted the transfer pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988), which allows for transfer when it is "[flor the convenience of
parties and witnesses" and "in the interest of justice."
108. See Inland Credit Corp v. M/T. Bow Egret, 552 F.2d 1148, 1152 (5th Cir. 1977).
109. See 19 U.S.C. § 1605 (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 881(c)(2) (1988).
110. See infra notes 115-118 and accompanying text.
111. See infra notes 113-114 and accompanying text.
112. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
113. See Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 23 (1960); supra notes
38-41 and accompanying text.
114. See Continental Grain Co., 364 U.S. at 23; United States v. An Article of Drug
Consisting of 4,680 Pails, 725 F.2d 976, 983 (5th Cir. 1984).
115. 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 458 (1874).
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Court would have lost a chance to hear the merits of the case." 6 There-
fore, a second policy underlying the exceptions to the "no res, no case"
rule is the preservation of the right to appeal and to ensure that cases are
decided correctly.
A third policy behind the exceptions to the "no res, no case" rule is
that courts recognize that forfeiture is a very harsh remedy."' Judge
Vance, echoing the Supreme Court, wrote in his dissent to One Lear Jet
Aircraft: "'Forfeitures are not favored; they should be enforced only
when within both [the] letter and spirit of the law.' "118
A final policy behind the exceptions, as evidenced by the storage ex-
ception created by Congress, is a desire to keep the law procedurally
efficient and within the bounds of common sense." 9 For example, if
there is no place to store seized goods inside the jurisdiction, Congress
intended to allow courts to move the goods outside the jurisdiction.
Most courts that have applied the "no res, no case" rule have simply
applied the facts to the already existing exceptions to determine whether
these facts fit an existing exception. They have not examined the policies
behind the exceptions, nor have they made an effort to determine
whether new exceptions should be created."2 Had these courts ex-
amined the policies behind the exceptions, they might have concluded
that a new exception should be created. Specifically, the policies under-
pinning the existing exceptions support the creation of another exception
that would continue jurisdiction when the government removes the res
after a forfeiture hearing. In other words, while the "no res, no case"
rule would continue to be valid in other in rem proceedings, the rule
would not be valid in forfeiture proceedings.
C. The Argument for a "No Res, No Case" Exception for Forfeiture
This new exception to the "no res, no case" rule would further the
policies of the already existing exceptions by allowing appellate courts to
ensure that disputes were decided correctly and that litigants received
116. See The Rio Grande, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) at 460.
117. For examples in which courts ordered forfeiture despite the fact that the punish-
ment was more severe than the corresponding criminal action, see infra note 126 and
accompanying text.
118. United States v. One Lear Jet Aircraft, 836 F.2d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir.) (en banc)
(quoting United States v. One 1936 Model Ford, 307 U.S. 219, 226 (1939)), cert denied,
487 U.S. 1204 (1988).
119. See S. Rep. No. 2326, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 3,900, 3,906 (1954).
120. See, e.g., One Lear Jet Aircraft, 836 F.2d at 1574 n.2 (dismissing claim of im-
proper release of res in a footnote with no discussion of policy behind exception); United
States v. $79,000 in United States Currency, 801 F.2d 738, 739 (5th Cir. 1986) (dis-
missing claim of improper release with one sentence and without inquiry into policy be-
hind the exception); United States v. One 1979 Rolls-Royce Corniche Convertible, 770
F.2d 713, 716-17 (7th Cir. 1985) (distinguishing facts from The Rio Grande with no dis-
cussion of the policy behind exception created by that case).
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their full day in court. In addition, it would protect litigants from the
harsh penalty of forfeiture.
Moreover, a new exception to the "no res, no case" rule is justified
because in rem forfeiture is an idea in decline. The Supreme Court la-
belled the idea of forfeiture based on in rem jurisdiction "an ancient salt-
water admiralty fiction." '121 The Court also noted that the fiction has
been called "'archaic,' 'an animistic survival from remote times,' 'irra-
tional' and 'atavistic.' "122 This rule also has been highly criticized by
commentators. 123 Litigants should not be denied an appellate forum
based on such a legal fiction. As one judge has stated, "[a]s the doctrine
of personification... loses force, so should the rules which rest on it."124
Finally, and most importantly, the criminal nature of civil forfeiture
dictates that every procedural safeguard be used to ensure that courts
produce a fair result. Civil forfeiture actions are "civil" in name only.
As the Supreme Court has noted, "a forfeiture proceeding is quasi-crimi-
nal in character. Its object, like a criminal proceeding, is to penalize for
the commission of an offense against the law."' 125 Civil forfeiture penal-
ties are often harsher than those that attach to the corresponding crimi-
nal action.1 26 In addition, the procedural rules for civil forfeiture favor
the government to such a degree that forfeiture actions rarely go to
trial. 27 In fact, forfeiture actions are so analogous to criminal actions
that the Supreme Court has held that evidence obtained in violation of
the fourth and fifth amendments may not be used in these actions. 128
One could argue, of course, that denial of jurisdiction supports a policy
of judicial economy. Moreover, claimants have ten days to file a bond or
to move for a stay in order to preserve their right to an appeal, and if
they fail to take these procedural precautions than they should not have a
right to appeal.
Nonetheless, in light of the excessive penalties that often result from
121. Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 23 (1960).
122. Id. (footnote omitted).
123. See G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty 616 (2d ed. 1975); Winn,
Seizures of Private Property in the War Against Drugs: What Process is Due?, 41 Sw. L.J
1111, 1112-13 (1988).
124. United States v. One Lear Jet Aircraft, 836 F.2d 1571, 1579 (1lth Cir.) (en banc)
(Vance, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1204 (1988).
125. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 (1965).
126. In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974), for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture of a yacht which had single marijuana ciga-
rette aboard when the criminal penalty would have been far less. See Valukas & Walsh,
supra note 2, at 36; see also One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 700-01 (forfeiture of
car worth $1,000 when criminal penalty would be a maximum fine of $500); United
States v. One 1986 Mercedes Benz, 846 F.2d 2, 4-5 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding forfeiture of
Mercedes and $2,710 when remains of one marijuana cigarette were found in ashtray).
127. See Valukas & Walsh, supra note 2, at 34; see also supra note 43 and accompany-
ing text (discussing government's procedural advantages).




forfeiture laws" 9 and the comparatively low burden of proof associated
with these laws,13 courts should not relinquish the ability to hear an
appeal in an attempt to lighten their dockets. Rather, courts should de-
termine whether the failure to file a bond or move to stay is a result of
carelessness or of a genuine inability' to take appropriate action within
the specified time. If the court determines that the failure to act is a
result of carelessness, the court should refuse to hear the appeal. If, how-
ever, the failure to act is a result of a genuine inability to act, then the
court should apply the "no res, no case" rule.
IV. THE CONSENT To IN PERSONAM THEORY
Alternatively, courts could hear the appeal by finding that the United
States has consented to in personam jurisdiction. The theory that the
United States is subject to in personam jurisdiction is based on the idea
that by seeking the relief of the court, the United States has agreed to be
bound by a decision made by that court system.' 32 This idea is not unu-
sual. Many courts have held that by taking an action, or by failing to
take an action, a litigant submits himself to in personam jurisdiction.I33
At least one court has held that the United States, simply by intervening
as a claimant and filing a counterclaim, had consented to in personam
jurisdiction.13 ' In a forfeiture proceeding, the United States has done
more than intervene as a claimant-the United States has initiated the
proceeding and should therefore be subject to jurisdiction. 3
Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow counterclaims in
in rem proceedings.' 36 Jurisdiction for the counterclaim is not in rem
because in rem jurisdiction is asserted against property, not an individ-
ual. '37 Therefore, the inference must be that when a plaintiff brings an in
rem action, the plaintiff consents to in personam jurisdiction for counter-
129. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
131. One example of a genuine inability to take action would be an inability to afford a
supersedeas bond. See, eg., United States v. One Lear Jet Aircraft, 836 F.2d 1571, 1574
n.1 (1 1th Cir.) (en banc) (record does not clearly state that corporation could not afford a
supersedeas bond), cert denied, 487 U.S. 1204 (1988).
132. See id. at 1578 (Vance, J., dissenting).
133. See, eg., Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694, 709 (1982) (jurisdiction imposed as a sanction for failure to reply to discovery
request); Petrowski v. Hawkeye-Security Co., 350 U.S. 495, 496 (1956) (a defendant may
stipulate to jurisdiction); Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67 (1938) (court may impose in
personam jurisdiction upon plaintiff when plaintiff files cross-action).
134. See Treasure Salvors v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569
F.2d 331, 335 (5th Cir. 1978).
135. See One Lear JetAircraft, 836 F.2d at 1579 (Vance, J., dissenting).
136. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 13; Supp. Fed. R. Civ. P. E(7).
137. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734 (1877); J. Friedenthal, M. Kane, & A.
Miller, Civil Procedure 114 (1985). But see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 ("'juris-
diction over a thing,' is a customary elliptical way of referring to jurisdiction over the




claims. If a court can impose in personam jurisdiction on a plaintiff for
counterclaims, the court should be able to impose in personam jurisdic-
tion entirely.
The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction in order to
issue an effective holding is a function of the due process clause. 138 As a
result, the requirement protects "an individual liberty interest."' 139 In
light of the origins of the in personam limitation of a court's power,
courts should be less hesitant to impose jurisdiction on the government
than on private individuals for two reasons. First, because the United
States is the paramount sovereign, and not an individual, it has no Con-
stitutional interest in being free of in personam jurisdiction. Second, the
United States would have minimum contacts everywhere in the United
States, and imposing in personam jurisdiction on the government for the
purpose of the appeal would therefore "not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.' ""4
In United States v. One Lear Jet Aircraft,"4' the court opined that to
hold that the government consented to in personam jurisdiction would
violate the concept of in rem jurisdiction. 142 The court's argument is
flawed analytically because it fails to consider the position of the party
denying the court's jurisdiction. In the typical in rem case involving a
res that has been removed from the court's control, the issue before the
court is whether the plaintiff can impose in personam jurisdiction on the
defendant. 14 3 It is axiomatic that a plaintiff cannot assert in rem jurisdic-
tion over a defendant when the res is not before the court. 1' In the cases
considered in this Note, however, the plaintiff government has already
asserted jurisdiction over a res, and now, as aplaintiff, is denying that the
court has jurisdiction. To hold that the government is subject to in per-
sonam jurisdiction in this instance does not in any way offend the con-
cept of in rem proceedings.
Courts should hold, therefore, that the government consents to in per-
sonam jurisdiction simply by bringing the action against the property. "45
Such a holding would allow appellate courts to hear an appeal in every
instance.
138. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 702 (1982).
139. Id.
140. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
141. 836 F.2d 1571 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1204 (1988)
142. See id. at 1576-77.
143. See id at 1579 (Vance, J., dissenting).
144. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877); J. Friedenthal, M. Kane & A.
Miller, supra note 137, at 114.
145. Such a holding would not be necessary in non-forfeiture, in rem actions because
the situation is different. Plaintiffs other than the government have a constitutional inter-
est in being free from in personam jurisdiction, and therefore courts should be more re-
luctant when imposing jurisdiction on them.
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CONCLUSION
The in rem fiction for forfeiture actions should not be used to deny
losing claimants a chance to appeal district court decisions. The policies
behind the already existing exceptions to the rule that the res must be
present in the jurisdiction support the creation of a new exception to
allow continued jurisdiction after the United States possesses the res. In
addition, courts should hold that the United States has impliedly con-
sented to in personam jurisdiction by instituting a forfeiture action.
Either approach would allow appellate courts to ensure that forfeiture
disputes are decided accurately and justly.
Paul S. Grossman

